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Abstract 
This study attempt to identify whether family ownership can strengthen the relationship between board of directors  
on conservatism. Our main hypothesis are tested on a sample of 99 Indonesia firms that list on Indonesian Stock 
Exchange (IDX). The result show that there is positive relationship between audit comitee on conservatism. This 
study also show that there is no relationship between proportion of independent directors on conservatism. Our 
result also suggest the existence of family ownership weaken the impact between the proportion of independent 
directors and conservatism; while family ownership does not weaken or strengthen the audit committee 
relationship to conservatism. The evidence deepen the emperical evidence of Agency Coflict Type II and 
entrenchment effect among indonesian firms that owned by family. Accounting Conservatism in concentrated 
ownership is under control of family ownership through the hand of board of directors. 
Keywords: Agency conflict Type II, Characteristics of Board of Directors, Family Ownership, Accounting 
Conservatism 
 
1. Introduction 
A financial report based on the accounting standard provided flexibility for the management in choosing method 
and accounting estimation. Flexibility in choosing method and estimation emerge due to grey area in standard. 
Methods that can be chosen as well as the accounting estimates that are not constrained also the fact that the 
condition of uncertain business could potentially lead management in a state of hesitation in the decision making. 
Under conditions of doubt, management must apply conservatism. 
Conservatism is one of the principles which can be defined as the tendency of accountants who require 
a higher level of verification to recognize the advantages compared to a loss (Basu, 1997). Accounting 
conservatism can be interpreted as an attitude of pessimism that is not anticipated profit earned, but anticipate all 
potential losses that occurred (Watts, 2003a). Under conditions of pessimism, conservatism is useful to prevent 
opportunistic behavior from managers (Watts, 2003b). 
Pros and cons of the existence of conservatism in accounting is often debated related to the economic 
consequences occured. Researchers who agree with the existence of conservatism stated that by presenting 
financial report in understatement, the company tried to protect creditors and owners from management as well as 
reduce the possibility of agency conflicts (Watts, 2003a). Conservatism cause manager can not act 
opportunistically as to make the financial statements as a media contract then use these contracts to enrich 
themselves (Claessens et al., 2002). 
Conservatism is determined by good corporate governance mechanisms relating to the characteristics 
board of directors (Ahmed and Duellman 2007; Indrayati 2010; Wardhani 2007). The board of directors require 
financial statements presented in conservative number with consideration of the ease of obtaining loans from 
financial institutions and the benefit obtained by the company. The Company seeks to protect creditors by 
presenting financial statements with a conservative figure (Sari et al. 2014). The implications of conservatism is 
the company's reported earnings lower than it should, causing allocation dividend to shareholders low. Lower 
dividend payments resulted in the company cause sufficient cash to pay debts (Ratnadi et al., 2013). Meanwhile, 
another benefit of conservatism according to (Ball et al., 2013), with the presence of conservatism companies can 
avoid investments that have a negative NPV.  
According to Lins and Warnock (2004), a mechanism that can control the behavior of the commissioners 
can be classified into two groups: the company's internal mechanism and external mechanisms. The internal 
mechanism of the company is the ownership structure and management structure, while the external mechanism 
is regulation in which the company operate. This study used the company's internal mechanism which is ownership 
structure as moderating variables. 
The ownership structure of the company determine the application of conservatism (Chen et al., 2009; 
Limantauw, 2012; Ratnadi et al., 2013; Zureigat et al., 2014). In the context of conservatism, the findings about 
the effect of the ownership structure to conservatism still inconsistence caused by the two different views (Porta 
et al., 1999; Ratnadi et al., 2013; Zureigat et al., 2014). In point of view agency theory, family ownership can 
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mitigate (alignment effect) or even sharpen (entrenchment effect) agency problems that occur in the company 
(Setia et al., 2011).  
The ownership structure used in this study is family ownership with the thought of the ownership 
structure in the ASEAN countries, especially in Indonesia is different from other countries where the ownership 
structure is dominated by family ownership in large numbers (Alijoyo et al., 2004). Family ownership in large 
numbers is a significant aspect that can influence the direction of policy related companies as well as reflect the 
culture of the management companies in indonesia . 
Previous researchers such as Ahmed and Duellman (2007); Indrayati (2010); and Wardhani (2007), have 
not considered the existence of family ownership on their model. 
 
1.1 Aim of Study 
This study aims to examine whether family ownership can strengthen the relationship between board of directors 
and conservatism. Conservatism is proxied by market approach by Beaver and Ryan (2005). 
 
1.2 Significance of Study 
This study contributes in enhace the empirical studies on Agency Conflicts Type II which is still limited in 
Indonesia public firms. The remaining of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses study of literature 
and hypothesis development. Section 3 describes research methodology, Section 4 explain the results of study and 
continued by section 5 with conclusion and recommendations. 
 
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
2.1 Agency Problem II 
Agency theory explains the relationship separation of ownership and control over the company (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976). In a situation that management controls companies and principal as the owner of capital, the 
conflict that occured is between management and shareholders. Agency conflict between shareholders and 
management can be minimized by concentrated ownership. Concentration of ownership may supervise 
management decisions, but it raises another problem. The agency problem between the agent and the principal can 
be overcome but the problem of conflicts between minority shareholders and majority shareholders began to 
emerge (Villalonga and Amit 2004). 
The main theory used in this research is the agency theory which the agency problem type II. 
Concentrated ownership structure owned by the majority shareholder, in this study is the family ownership, may 
cause differences in agency conflicts and can affect financial reporting ( Watts, 2003a). 
Agency Theory Type II describes the agency problem occured because the majority shareholder has a 
controlling interest in the company to influence management in determining the direction of the company's 
decision. Majority shareholder control rights can be used to maximize its interests by way of expropriation of 
minority shareholders in the form of misallocation of assets redistribution. Agency theory type II lead to two views 
which are entrenchment effect and alignment effect. Entrenchment effect happened when majority shareholders 
doing expropriate on minority shareholders using their control right, while alignment effect happened when 
majority shareholders has the same aim with minority shareholders to maximize company value (Porta et al., 1999). 
 
2.2 Independent Directors 
Independent directors is a position which has no affiliation or relationship with board of directors, board of 
commisioners and shareholders. Independent directors selected independently and transparently, based on 
competence, free from the influence of the internal company, working objectively guided by the principles of good 
corporate governance. The existence of independent directors in the company aims to provide independent 
management climate and more objective to provide protection not only for shareholders but also stakeholders of 
the company as a whole. Therefore, in carrying out its duties, the independent directors need qualified and accurate 
information to carry out its monitoring function. 
The post of independent diretors is a strategic position. The experience and expertise of independent 
commissioners beneficial to provide a view on the policies that have been taken or to be taken by the management. 
They are required to oversee and implement the company's policies, which is prudence. In essence the position of 
independent directors is a mechanism to provide guidance and direction as well as the mechanism for overseeing 
the company's operations. Supervisory functions show that independent commissioner served as a center for the 
company's success and resilience (fcgi). 
 
2.3 Audit Committe 
Good Corporate Governance mechanisms that are linked to aspects of openness and dealing with the Board of 
Directors is the existence of an audit committee as a supervisory function in the company. The audit committee is 
a position that is required to have specialized in the field of accounting so as to give the contribution of the function 
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of monitoring that is more specific in the decision-making process related to accounting conservatism. The audit 
committee may also provide opinions and views on financial policies, internal controls and accounting treatment 
in each account (Siregar and Utama, 2008). 
Audit committees in large numbers makes it possible to carry out oversight functions on operational 
activities of the company include in its investment activities and give an opinion and a view over the lead on the 
implementation of accounting conservatism. The audit committee is an independent party which can address the 
information asymmetry by playing the role of intermediary. Companies that have high information asymmetry 
have a demand for high-usage policy conservatism. The audit committee which specializes in industrial clients 
tend to know the risk of the industry and can give specific suggestions for a more conservative in making financial 
decisions, especially related to accounting (Hamdan et al., 2012). 
 
2.4 Family Ownership 
The ownership structure is divided into two groups which is concentrated and dispersed. Dispersed ownership 
occurs in some countries such as Britain and the United States. Instead, the concentrated ownership structure 
occurred in the company in the East Asia and Eastern Europe that centered on a particular owner (Bhasin 2010; 
Claessens et al. 2002). Dispersed ownership structure occurs when the ownership of company shares owned by 
many investors and each investor has a relatively small equity value or do not have the controlling rights. However, 
the concentrated ownership structure, shareholders grouped themselves into a controlling shareholder or a 
shareholder in a large amount of share. The majority shareholder in Indonesia owned by family holdings. This fact 
is explained by Alijoyo et al. (2004). 
Family ownership may increase their right into cross-ownership structure, the pyramid, and through 
involvement in management company's. Increased ownership led to the magnitude of the ability of the majority 
shareholder to control the company. The ownership structure is said to be structured as a pyramid if there is the 
ultimate owner and there is at least one company in the chain of ultimate control rights owner (Claessens et al., 
2002; Siregar and Utama, 2008; Xu et al., 2012). Thus, the ownership of the company can be traced directly 
(imediat) and indirectly (ultimate). Pyramid ownership structure allows the founding family control over a very 
large enterprise networks, both on closed companies or already listed on the stock exchange. 
 
2.5 Accounting Conservatism 
Prudence which replaces the term conservatism was an act of caution in making decisions under uncertain 
conditions. Management precautions explained that the uncertainty and the risk of a condition attached in 
managing the company's operations. Related to the concept of conservatism, Lafond and Roychowdhury (2008) 
stated that in circumstances that are difficult to predict, the management will use the option to illustrate the 
accounting treatment less favorable circumstances. Conservatism accounting implications for the recognition of 
expenses or loss as early as possible, but defer the recognition of revenue or profits that are likely to occur in the 
foreseeable future. Under these conditions, the company will report earnings understatement. 
Accounting conservatism is defined by Watts (2003a) as a condition that is not anticipated profit, but 
anticipate all potential losses. The implication profit can not be recognized as real before legal claims can be 
verified, which shows that real earnings will be generated. Profit recognition depend on companies verification 
degree 
 
2.6 The Effect of Independen Directos on Accounting Conservatism (H1) 
Independent Directors is a party that is not affiliated with the management, shareholders and do not have a business 
relationship or other relationship that could affect independence in the management of the company. 
Characteristics independent of the existence of independent directors in the company becomes an important factor. 
The proportion of large amounts can of independent directors in the company allow it to supervise the directors 
and managers as well as the policies they set associated with conservatism (Indrayati, 2010). 
Knowledge of financial issues and business strategies from independent directors to make an 
independent commissioner to be more conservative. Independent commissioner has an obligation to act in good 
faith (due diligence) which is divided into two parts, duty of care and the duty of loyalty (Ahmed and Duellman 
2007). Prudence obligate independent directors to act and decide based on insufficient information. This action 
has the same characteristics as conservatism, which reacted cautiously to the uncertainties faced by the company 
(Fadzil et al., 2014). Independent commissioner requires quality financial statements, so they tend to apply 
conservatism. Therefore, conservatism became an indispensable tool by the board of directors to perform their 
functions in the company. 
Directors that dominated by internal party would weaken monitoring functions within the company so 
as to provide more opportunities for managers to perform opportunistic action by implementing a more aggressive 
accounting (less conservative) (Ahmed and Duellman 2007; Wardhani 2007). Based on the above it can be 
concluded hypothesis as follows: 
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H1: Proportion of Independen directors has positive effect on Accounting Conservatism 
 
2.7 The Effect of audit committee  on Accounting Conservatism 
The audit committee has a duty to ensure the financial statements of company in accordance with GAAP, the 
implementation of the internal control structure has been effective, the implementation of internal and external 
audit conducted according to prevailing standards, and make sure if there are findings then immediately reported 
to the management and follow-up the findings. The existence of the audit committee can improve the overall 
quality of the financial reporting process by applying the principle of conservatism. The existence of the audit 
committee encourages the implementation of corporate conservatism with consideration of the benefits obtained. 
Application of conservatism provides many benefits to the value of the company, one of which is mitigate the 
agency problem and avoid negative investment (Ball et al. 2013). 
The audit committee which specializes in industrial clients tend to know the risk so that the industry can 
give specific advice to be more conservative in making financial decisions, especially related to accounting 
(Hamdan et al., 2012). Uncertainties faced by the company can be mitigate by the presence of an experienced audit 
committee. The audit committee in carrying out its duties can provide advice on the management of the company 
to act more carefully . 
The existence of audit committees provide oversight functions in each company's operational activities 
and give an opinion and a view over the lead on the implementation of accounting conservatism. Based on the 
above it can be concluded exposure hypothesis as follows: 
H2: Audit Committee have positive effect on Accounting Conservatism 
 
2.7 The Effect of characteristics board of directors on Accounting Conservatism with  family ownership as 
moderating variable 
Majority ownership types in Indonesia is concentrated ownership structure (Bhasin, 2008; Claessens et al. 2002; 
Siregar and Utama 2008). Shareholders in concentrated ownership group themselves into a large shareholder or 
majority shareholder of the company and the majority shareholder in Indonesia owned by family holdings (Alijoyo 
et al., 2004). Agency theory Type II explain if there is a concentrated ownership then there are two different views, 
which are alignment effect and entrenchment effect. The effect that can strengthen relationships characteristic of 
commissioners against conservatism is the alignment effect. The effect of alignment states majority shareholders 
are aligned with minority shareholders to promote common interests and reduce opportunistic action. Yeh (2005) 
states that the greater rights of control possessed caused an incentive to manage the company consistent with the 
rules. The increase in the controlling rights motivate the majority shareholder from not doing expropriate. 
Family ownership gives description that family firms are not motivated to do the accounting aggressively 
by raising the value of earnings. The findings were based that by reporting the overstatement of the financial 
statements will only damage the reputation that has been built as well as the company's long-term performance 
(Wang, 2006). When linked with the characteristic relations commissioners against conservatism where 
commissioners require financial statements presented are conservative figures to still get a loan from a financial 
institution, the family ownership through the viewpoint of alignment effect can strengthen the relationship between 
the characteristics of the commissioners towards conservatism. The family as a majority shareholder can exercise 
the right of control to determine the characteristics of the board of directors that aims to achieve the desired goal. 
Based on the above it can be concluded exposure hypothesis as follows: 
H3a: Family Ownership Strengthen the effect of proprotion independen direstors on accounting 
conservatism 
H3b: Family Ownership Strengthen the effect of Audit Committee on Accounting Conservatism 
 
3. Research Methodology 
3.1 Population and Sample 
This research was conducted by taking the population of the listed companies on the Indonesia Stock Exchange 
during 2012-2014. The sample is determined by using purposive sampling technique, while the criteria are (1) 
non-financial companies listed on Indonesian Stock Exchange, (2) corporate data entereprises available and 
accessible. These criterias obtain number of observations os 297 firm-year. Research model is featured in figure 
1. 
 
3.2 Data Sources 
This study uses secondary data. The data is published by Indonesia Stock Exchange through the official web IDX 
www.idx.co.id and OSIRIS to gahter information about family ownership. 
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3.3 Variables and Measurements 
3.3.1.Independent Variables 
1. Independent Director 
Independent directors are measured using the proportion of independent directors in the company. This data can 
be viewed in the company's annual report. Formula to calculate proportion of independent directors is the number 
of independent directors / total number of board of directors. 
2. Committee Audit 
The audit committee is measured using a dummy. The company that employs the audit committee is given the 
value 1 while those not given the value 0 
3.3.2 Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable is accounting conservatism. It is calculated with the model of Beaver and Ryan (2005). 
Beaver and Ryan (2005) use market approach by using P/B ratio. P/B ratio is based on the conservatism that 
suppress the book value of net assets relative to the actual economic value of the company. The higher the ratio 
value, the higher the company's conservatism. 
3.3.3 Moderated Variable 
Moderated variabel is family ownership. Family ownership can be determined by two approaches, imediat 
approach and ultimate approach (Porta et al., 1999). Imediat ownership approach is the percentage of direct 
ownership in public companies. The company is said to family ownership if there is voting rights more than 20% 
(Anderson et al., 2003; Claessens et al., 2002; Porta et al., 1999). Family ownership through imediat approach can 
be seen directly in the notes to the financial statements. La Porta et al., (1999) states that if the company is owned 
by another institution then used ultimate approach. The ultimate approach search voting rights indirectly by using 
the analysis of pyramids and cross-ownership structure. This information can be done with the assistance of 
OSIRIS program.  
 
3.4 Empirical Model 
Family ownership can strengthen or weaken the charactersistics of board directors on conservatism are to be tested 
by using Moderated Regression Analysis (MRA) as follows: 
KON_ACC = α + β1KOM_INDEP + β2KOM_AUD + β3KOM_INDEP*FML_OWN + 
β4KOM_AUD*FML_OWN +  et 
Notation: 
KON_ACC : Accounting Conservatism calculated with the model of Beaver and Ryan (2005) 
KOM_INDEP : Proportion of Independent Directors 
KOM_AUD : Committee Audit 
FML_OWN : Family Ownership 
α  : Constanta 
β1,β2,β3,β4 : Regression Coefficient 
 
4. Result and Discussion 
4.1 Sample Description 
Average shareholders control rights of family ownership are 54.24%. These results indicate that the rights of 
majority shareholders control the company owned by the family while table 1 show that the maximum value of 
the control rights are 96.31%. These data indicate that the ability of the majority shareholder to control the 
company is substantial. These research results are consistent with findings of Siregar and Utama (2008). The 
largest control rights are concentrated in the families. Thus, it is potential for Agency Conflict Type II occured in 
public firms in Indonesia. About eighty-six percent pattern of increased control rights are conducted through 
pyramidal ownership, and the rest of fourteen percent are through direct ownership.  
 
4.2 Regression Analysis Results 
Table 2 present the regression analysis results for hypothesis 1, hypothesis 2, hypothesis 3 and hypothesis 4. The 
result interpreted based on p-valued compared to alpha. The result is said to be significant if below alpha (5%). 
The testing focus is on coefficient β3 and β4 which show family ownership weaken or strengthen the impact of 
board of directors on accouting conservatism.  
Before conducting the hypothesis testing, classic assumption tested on moderated regression model in 
Table 3. Accordingly, there is no classic assumption problem. Classic assumption tests that have been done include 
heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation, and normality. If all of the classic assumption tests are fulfilled, then it will 
produce linear accounting conservatism estimator, minimum variance  and unbiased (Best Linear Unbiased 
Estimator = BLUE). 
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4.3 The Effect of Independen Directos on Accounting Conservatism (H1) 
The results show there is a positive correlation between the proportion of independent directors on the application 
of conservatism. This study is not able to prove hypothesis 1 (H1). The results of this study are consistent with 
previous studies conducted by Setia atmaja et al., (2011) and the results of a survey by Alijoyo et al., (2004). Both 
studies stated that the strong control of the company founder and family ownership as a majority shareholder 
makes the directors are not independent. The post of independent directors only become the company's needs for 
regulatory compliance regardless of the function that should be run. 
An explanation of these conditions can be seen from the proportion of independent directors in Indonesia 
up to an average of 35.63%. This amount is considered not high enough to cause the independent directors can 
dominate the measures taken by the board of commissioners. If the independent directors constitute the majority 
(> 50%) then it may be more effective to run the monitoring role within the company. Appointment of directors 
in this case is considered only based on regulatory compliance. 
 
4.4 The Effect of audit committee  on Accounting Conservatism 
The results are consistent with research conducted by Ward (2007). The audit committee who has specialized in 
the industry tend to understand and know the risks so that the industry can give specific advice to be more 
conservative in making financial decisions, especially related to accounting (Hamdan et al., 2012). 
Uncertainties faced by the company in its operations lead to more need advice than supervision. The 
audit committee in carrying out its duties can provide advice on the management of the company to act more 
carefully. The existence of the audit committee may provide the opinions and views for directing to the 
implementation of accounting conservatism. 
 
4.5 The Effect of Independent Directors on Accounting Conservatism with  family ownership as moderating 
variable 
The test results proved that family ownership weaken the relationships between proportion of independent 
directors on accounting conservatism. The study's findings are not in accordance with the predictions of the 
hypothesis 3a (H3a) that family ownership can strengthen the effect of proportion of independent directors on 
accounting conservatism. The Results of the study is not able to affirm the assumption of the alignment effect 
which states that the ownership of a family trying to act in harmony with the minority shareholders by being 
conservative in the management of the company. 
The control rights is voting rights that can be utilized by the majority shareholder to control the 
company's important policies. This study shows the majority shareholder want to maximize utility through the 
hands of management. As described by  (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) and Morck et al., (2004) that the majority 
shareholders are trying to allocate resources to benefit private companies. The greater concentration of control 
rights, the more likely the majority shareholder to obtain private benefits (Fan and Wong 2002). 
Agency theory which states the agency problem of type II Villalonga and Amit (2004) in concentrated 
ownership applicable to explain these results. Improved control rights of majority shareholders is explained by 
entrenchment effect. Improved control rights to encourage the majority shareholders to maximize their own 
welfare with the distribution of wealth on the other side (expropriation on minority shareholders). 
While, the existence of family ownership is not able to strengthen or weaken the audit committee 
relationship towards conservatism. The study's findings are not in accordance with the predictions of the hypothesis 
3b (H3b). The situation indicates that the presence of family ownership does not alter the function of the audit 
committee in carrying out their duties. 
 
5. Conclusion and Recommendations 
The results showed that conservatism is influenced by the existence of the audit committee. Audit committees can 
give specific suggestions for a more conservative in making decisions. The results also show that conservatism is 
not influenced by the proportion of independent directors. This condition is indicated that the post of independent 
directors only become the company's needs for regulatory compliance regardless of the function that should be 
run. 
In addition, the results also showed that the existence of accounting conservatism becomes weaken in 
the presence of family ownership as a moderating variable. Family ownership as the majority shareholder has the 
right to control the board of directors for their utilities. Majority shareholder is motivated to do expropriation by 
reporting financial statement in overstatement. Reporting financial report in overstatement conditions is againts 
the principle of conservatism. The results also show that the presence of family ownership does not strengthen or 
weaken the audit committee relationship to conservatism. This condition proves that the existence of family 
ownership does not alter the functions or duties of the audit committee. 
Results of this study proved entrenchment effect that occurs in the family company listed on the 
Indonesia Stock Exchange. High control rights motivated the expropriation of the majority shareholder. With the 
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right controls, family ownership can increase their utility through the hands of management or in this research 
board of directors. Improved control rights encourage the majority shareholders to maximize their own welfare 
with the distribution of wealth on the other side (expropriation of minority shareholders). 
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Table 1. Statistic Descriptive Test 
Variabel Minimum Value Maximum Value Average Value Standard Deviation 
KOM_INDEP 0 0,667 0,3495 0,1296 
KOM_AUD 0 1 0,9552 0,2073 
FML_OWN 0,2093 0,9631 0,5424 0,1586 
KON_ACC -3,160 8,280 1,546 1,501 
 
Table 2. Moderated Regression Analysis Result 
Variabel Coefficient t-value p-value 
Konstanta 0,918 2,063 0,040 
Kom_Indep -0,428 -0,617 0,269 
Kom_Aud 0,814 1,877 0,031* 
Konstanta 0,263 0,488 0,626 
Kom_Indep -0,559 -0,808 0,210 
Kom_Aud 0,879 2,034 0,022* 
Fml_Own 1,177 2,122 0,018* 
Konstanta -0,424 -0,231 0,817 
Kom_Indep 6,285 2,952 0,002* 
Kom_Aud -1,002 -0,557 0,289 
Fml_Own 2,205 0,731 0,233 
Kom_Indep*Fml_Own -12,013 -3,420 0,001* 
Kom_Aud*Fml_Own 3,546 1,162 0,123 
Dependent variable = Accounting Conservatism 
Sig. F Change = 0,003 
R2 = 0,05 
Description: ** significance at α = 5% 
KOM_INDEP = Proportion of Independent Directors; KOM_AUD = Committee Audit; FML_OWN = Family 
Ownership; α = Constanta; β1,β2,β3,β4  = Regression Coefficient 
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Table 3. Classic Assumptions Results 
Variabel Heteroskedacity Test Normality Test Autocorrelation Test 
KOM_INDEP 0,394   
KOM_AUD 0,158   
FML_OWN 0,443   
KON_ACC 0,578   
Kom_Indep*Fml_Own 0,250   
Kom_Aud*Fml_Own 0,213   
Residual  0,979  
Durbin-Watson   2,126 
Description: The Heteroskedasticity is tested based on Glejser test. The test carried out on Accounting 
Conservatism model confirmed there is no heteroskedasticity in the residual. Examination of the normality error 
term of Accounting Conservatism model employed in this research showed that the error term has a normal 
distribution. 
 
Figure 1. Research Model 
 
